

An Inside Look:**NIXON'S SIDE OF THE '60 STORY**

The race for the Presidency in 1960, won by John F. Kennedy, left bitter feelings, started arguments that still smolder.

Now, for the first time, the loser in that race—Richard M. Nixon—gives his views on crucial questions raised by the election.

Does Nixon feel he was made a victim of

the religious issue? Why didn't he demand recounts in States where fraud was charged? What kept President Eisenhower out of the early stages of the campaign?

The account that appears here is drawn from Nixon's new book, "Six Crises," published by Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Out of 68,334,742 votes cast for the Democratic and Republican candidates for President on Nov. 6, 1960, John F. Kennedy was credited with 34,227,096; Richard M. Nixon with 34,107,646. Democrat Kennedy thus became President with a majority of 119,450 votes—one of the narrowest political victories in American history.

Many questions were raised about that narrow victory and by the campaign that preceded it. Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate, has sought to answer some of these questions in a book, "Six Crises," being published by Doubleday and Company, Inc., on sale March 29.

It is from this book that the untold story of crucial situations that decided the 1960 election—and the course of U. S. history—can be reconstructed.

During the days that followed Nov. 8, 1960, millions of people wondered why the Republican candidate conceded the election without demanding recounts of votes in key States.

At that time, nearly complete returns showed Mr. Kennedy leading Mr. Nixon by 303 electoral votes to 219 for Mr. Nixon. There were 15 other electoral votes not pledged to either candidate.

But it was not that clear-cut, Mr. Nixon recalls, giving this assessment of the situation:

In Illinois and Missouri, a switch of a few thousand votes from Democratic to Republican would have given him 259 electoral votes to Mr. Kennedy's 263. That, plus a similar switch in any two of three other States—New Mexico, Nevada and Hawaii—where the vote was also very close, would have reversed the result. And Mr. Nixon, by the swing of between 11,000 and 13,000 votes in the right States, would have become the new President.

It was in some of these States, moreover, that Nixon supporters charged votes

Democrats. Particularly singled out was Illinois's Cook County, which embraces Chicago. Charges of mass theft of votes were also aimed at Texas, where Mr. Kennedy had a fairly close squeak.

Why no recount. Why, in the light of this situation, did not Mr. Nixon ask for recounts in areas where the switch-over of a few thousand votes might give him victory? In his book, the former Vice President gives this explanation:

"From the evidence I examined, there was no question but that there was real substance to these charges. . . . But substance or not, when I looked into the legal aspects of the situation, I found that it would take at least a year and a half to get a recount in Cook County, and that there was no procedure whatever for a losing candidate to get a recount in Texas."

Many of Mr. Nixon's friends and associates urged, nevertheless, that he demand a recount, he recalls. They wanted him to continue fighting as long as there was any hope whatever of winning. There were those who felt that, even if the effort failed, the publicity that would result from possible disclosure of election irregularities would be widespread, and would be helpful to Republican candidates in the 1962 and 1964 elections. The idea was appealing, Mr. Nixon concedes, but in the end he decided against it, and he tells the reason why:

"If I were to demand a recount, the organization of the new Administration and the orderly transfer of responsibility from the old to the new might be delayed for months. The situation within the entire Federal Government would be chaotic."

The former Vice President reasoned that members of the Eisenhower Administration would be left with no clear idea of their powers and responsibilities. In the same manner, new ap-

CLOSE VICTORY of President Kennedy in 1960 could have been upset by switch of several thousand votes in key States, writes Mr. Nixon, shown with Mrs. Nixon in California as final returns came in.

—Wide World



THE TIMETABLE FOR ALGERIA

Within 6 months:

Moslem and European Algerians to vote in a referendum. Landslide for "independence in co-operation with France" is expected.

Within 10 months:

Algeria to be sovereign under Moslem Government, with French aid continued, rights of Europeans guaranteed.

Within 18 months:

France's 400,000 troops in Algeria to be reduced to 80,000. All must leave within 3 years. French naval and air base may be retained for at least 15 years.

AT ANY POINT,

this agreement can break down, and war may be resumed. More war is the aim of the Europeans' "Secret Army."

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war in Algeria is making De Gaulle stronger than ever in this aim.

Algeria's Moslem leaders, too, are looking beyond the cease-fire, beyond the current terrorism, to the peace.

The Algerian Nationalist Government, composed of leaders of yesterday's "rebels," held its first full meeting at Rabat, capital of Morocco, on March 22. Five of the 12 Ministers had just returned to North Africa, released by the French as a part of the cease-fire agreement.

In Morocco, in Tunisia too, these 12 Algerian Moslems were national heroes. Throughout the war the Moslem rebels had a military "sanctuary" in the two neighboring countries from the French efforts to crush their rebellion. They

operated training camps in Western Tunisia and in Eastern Morocco close to Algeria's frontiers.

What Arabs see ahead. Now that an independent Algeria is scheduled to make its appearance this year, there is growing support in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria too, for "Mahgreb"—union of the three countries of Northwest Africa.

Morocco's King, Tunisia's President and Algeria's Moslem leaders too, all favor such a union. All three countries were developed by France, recognize French as a national language, have peoples of Arab and Berber stock who are Moslem in their religion, speak Arabic.

In addition, all three countries are still dependent on aid from France. Al-

geria, particularly, must count on French markets, French imports and French aid to get along as a country.

An interested spectator as Algeria heads toward peace and independence is Khrushchev of Moscow. The Soviet Union, in defiance of De Gaulle's anger, gave Algeria's Moslem Government its official recognition within hours of the cease-fire agreement.

Algeria's leaders, so far, have kept the Communists at arm's length. But, like Morocco which has accepted some Soviet aid, the Algerians plan a "neutralist" Government in foreign policy.

Agony of Algeria is not over yet.

OAS terrorists, in the night of March 22 and in the day following, attacked French security forces at the former Governor's palace in Algiers with mortars, bazookas, machine-gun fire. There was firing throughout Algiers.

In Oran, OAS-led Europeans fought a two-hour gun battle with French Army riot squads. De Gaulle, accepting the challenge, sent France's Mediterranean fleet to the big naval and air base of Mers-el-Kebir just outside the city.

Odds favor peace. Even at the height of the OAS attacks, however, it was clear French Army and police resistance to the Europeans was hardening. Die-hard OAS units, heavily outgunned and outnumbered by De Gaulle's forces, may go underground, keep terrorism simmering. But their chances of getting France back into war with Moslem Algerians appeared slim.

With peace in Algeria, the outlook is for a three-country North African alliance of "neutralist" Moslems. In France the same peace may give De Gaulle a chance to bid for greater military power in Western Europe.

SAND, WINE, OIL AND HANDOUTS

lars into Algerian investments. In addition, 7½ years of Algerian war has cost France well over 10 billion dollars.

Algeria's sands hold enough natural gas to supply all Europe. Algeria's oil goes to France at premium prices.

Most of the people of Algeria are unskilled and uneducated Moslem peasants and tribesmen living miserably on annual incomes of about \$50 per year. European Algerians provide the skills.

To get peace in Algeria, France has promised to subsidize the Algerian economy with about 400 million dollars a year, to develop Algeria's oil and gas fields with new investment capital.

Outlook for the "new nation" of Algeria: continued economic dependence on France for many years to come.



—United Nations

PLIGHT of the Moslems—whose incomes average \$50 per year—continues to drain Algeria's economy

pointees of the incoming Kennedy Administration would have extreme difficulty in making plans for the future.

Mr. Nixon feared, too, that "the bitterness that would be engendered by such a maneuver on my part" would achieve "incalculable harm and lasting damage." Finally, he foresaw lasting damage to the American image abroad, especially among newly emerging countries of the world that were getting their first taste of free elections, if Americans were to throw themselves into a stormy battle over whether the U. S. Presidency had been won "by thievery at the ballot box."

Mr. Nixon acknowledges that his decision not to support the recount efforts disappointed many Republicans, especially his friends and ardent supporters, but he says he could see for himself "no other responsible course of action."

The religious issue. Mr. Nixon discusses the part he believes the religious issue played in deciding the election, and comes up with the conclusion that it helped rather than hurt Mr. Kennedy. His own policy throughout the campaign, he writes, was to disassociate himself from any persons, no matter how strongly they might be supporting him, who based that support on religious grounds.

In the Democratic camp, however, he says, it was a different story. Here is the Nixon version:

Mr. Kennedy's key associates, he says, on every possible occasion and in every possible manner, kept pushing the religious issue to the foreground, keeping it highlighted as one of the central issues of the campaign, and even accusing the Republican candidate of fostering religious bigotry. This was particularly true in the big, Northern cities with a large percentage of Catholic voters—where it would do the Democrats the most good, he writes. It was, for Mr. Kennedy, says the author, a "'heads I win, tails you lose' proposition."

Catholics on Mr. Nixon's staff and top officials of the Republican Party were outraged, he relates, and at a policy meeting toward the end of the campaign urged him to make a speech—moderate in tone and reasonable in approach—calling on Protestant and Catholic voters alike to vote on the basis of real issues and not to be influenced in any way by the religion of the candidates. He adds:

"Everyone in the room that night thought I should make such a speech. In the end, I voted 'no.'"

Mr. Nixon explains his decision by saying that he felt such an appeal at that late date might open him to charges that he was motivated by bigotry and that he was deliberately trying to inflame the issue. Moreover, from a personal viewpoint, he considered the fact that Mr. Kennedy was a member of a religious group that had been denied the Presidency throughout the history of the United States and that he was justified, perhaps, in making every effort to prevent an outpouring of bigotry from blocking his goal of being the first Catholic to sit in the White House.

"I felt a responsibility," says Mr. Nixon, "to keep the lid on the boiling cauldron of embittered anti-Catholicism."

Also, the Republican candidate argued, it was likely that the election would prove to be one of the closest in the country's history, and he realized that if he brought up the religious issue late in the campaign and then won by a narrow margin, it would appear that his victory had stemmed directly from having injected that issue into the battle as a last, desperate measure.

"The cause of religious tolerance," he concludes, would have been "substantially set back" after years of painful but steady gains.


Views on Mr. Johnson. The former Vice President tells his reaction to selection of Lyndon B. Johnson on the Demo-

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VOTE RECOUNTS were spurned by Nixon despite charges of fraud in Illinois, where he drew large crowds, as in Peoria, above, and other States. Nixon says he felt recounts would delay orderly change of Government, cause chaos in the U. S.



TV-RADIO DEBATES with lesser-known Kennedy were "absolutely essential," says Nixon, because people wanted them, and to sidestep them would lay him open to charges he was "afraid to defend the Administration's and my own record."



—USN&WR Photos

REPUBLICANS' CHANCES of winning election would have been "increased" if Nelson Rockefeller, right, had been his running mate, Nixon believed. But New York's Governor declined to seek Vice Presidency at Republican Convention.

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NIXON'S SIDE OF '60 STORY

cratic ticket: It was no surprise to him that Mr. Johnson accepted the nomination for Vice President, because the former Texas Senator has always been, to Mr. Nixon, a "political pragmatist" who "has never had too much difficulty accommodating his principles to his politics." What surprised Mr. Nixon was Mr. Kennedy's selection of Mr. Johnson and the ease with which he was then able to "ram this choice down the throats" of his Northern supporters—the so-called "liberal" group.

This brought forcefully home to the Republican candidate that he was facing a skilled politician, a tough-minded and formidable foe.

Governor Rockefeller's decision. Mr. Nixon also recounts, for the first time, Nelson A. Rockefeller's decision not to seek second place on the Republican ticket in 1960. He



—UPI

CUBAN EXILES in Central America were in training to invade Cuba with U. S. aid when Kennedy urged tough action against Castro. Nixon was angered, because security hampered his reply. But Allen Dulles says Kennedy wasn't in on the secret.

writes of a preconvention meeting with Governor Rockefeller in New York:

The vice-presidential nomination was not urged on Mr. Rockefeller, nor did Mr. Nixon urge him to accept it if it were offered to him at the Convention. However, he told the Governor of the plans he had for expanding the duties of the Vice President in the international field and of the challenges such a position would offer.

Mr. Nixon assured Mr. Rockefeller that if he were to run for Vice President "the chances of the ticket's winning would be increased." Moreover, if the Republicans lost in 1960, Mr. Rockefeller would be in a good position to win acceptance by party leaders as the presidential nominee in 1964.

Governor Rockefeller replied with equal candor, recalls

Mr. Nixon, by saying he realized there probably would be pressures put on him at the Chicago Convention to run for Vice President, but that he simply did not want the job, and could not campaign with heartfelt enthusiasm. "At that point," says Mr. Nixon, "we dropped the subject."

President Eisenhower's role. After the Convention, Mr. Nixon called at the White House to inquire into President Eisenhower's plans for participation in the campaign. The President said he felt it was important for Mr. Nixon to "establish my own identity as the new leader of the party." The President then outlined his plan to avoid taking so active a part in the early stages of the campaign as would take the limelight away from the Vice President's appearances.

Mr. Eisenhower also said he felt that his great influence with the American people was due mostly to his image of being President of all the people, "and not just as a partisan as [former President Harry S.] Truman had been."

About those debates. Of all the questions raised during the 1960 campaign, none was more controversial than the Republican candidate's agreement to meet Mr. Kennedy in a series of four debates over nationwide television and radio networks. Many political veterans have said that Mr. Nixon made a mistake, that he had nothing to gain and everything to lose because he was a nationally known figure and Mr. Kennedy was not. Why, then, did he agree to the debates?

Mr. Nixon explains that he felt it was "absolutely essential" that he welcome the idea of the debates with unqualified enthusiasm. The reason: If he refused the challenge, it would leave him open to charges that he was "afraid to defend the Administration's and my own record."

More important than that, the former Vice President also felt he could not afford to back away from a program that, it had become apparent, the American people were eager to see and hear.

Mr. Nixon says his "tired" appearance on TV screens in the first of the debates was caused by the fact that, unknowingly, he had lost 10 pounds in weight during the first hectic week of the campaign.

Cuba: the hot issue. Mr. Nixon charges in his book that Mr. Kennedy endangered U. S. security when he urged, in a campaign speech, U. S. intervention in Cuba and aid to anti-Castro forces in that country, even though he had been briefed by the Central Intelligence Agency that U. S.-supported anti-Castro forces already were in training for an invasion.

The White House and Allen W. Dulles, former Director of the CIA, have denied that President Kennedy had been advised of the invasion plans before the election. Mr. Dulles said the charge apparently was the result of an "honest misunderstanding."

For the former Vice President, that incident was "the first and only time in the campaign I got mad at Kennedy—personally. . . . And my rage was greater because I could do nothing about it."

Mr. Nixon explains that he could not advocate intervention in Cuba's affairs because it might tip off the secret preparations for the invasion, and, in his final television debate with Mr. Kennedy, he was obliged to hold to a milder proposal to "quarantine" Cuba. He concludes:

"I was in the ironic position of appearing to be 'softer' on Castro than Kennedy—which was exactly the opposite of the truth, if only the whole record could be disclosed." [END]